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NOTE
A CALL TO REVITALIZE THE HEART OF NEPA:THE
ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS
Kelly Wittorff
The call to care for the Earth... is a human impulse as well as
a moral imperative. In so many modes - intuitive, aesthetic,
spiritual, religious - humans know that by protecting the Earth,
they find a sense of place and purpose and fulfill a moral obligation
to the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), the 1960's embodied an "environmental awakening" supported
by a growing grassroots backdrop.2 The awakening was brought to a
climax when an estimated twenty million people gathered nationwide to
express support for the environment at the first annual Earth Day
celebration on April 22, 1970. 3 This rise in environmental consciousness
and concern was also reflected in the legislation and court decisions of the
period.' Congress passed a myriad of environmentally protective

* This note received the Barbara W. Makar Writing Award for the outstanding note for Fall

2000.
1. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL E"AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULAnON: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
1111 (2d. ed. 1996).

2. Harvey Bartlett, Comment, Is NEPA SubstantiveReview Extinct,or MerelyHibernating?
ResurrectingNEPA Section 102(1), 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 411, 415-16 (2000).
3. See id. at416.
4. Id.
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legislation including the Wilderness Act of 1964, 5 the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966,6 and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968. 7
However, the birth of NEPA in 1969 constituted the most far-reaching
environmental legislation enacted by Congress and remains as such to
date.'
At first glance, NEPA seems nothing more than an "innocuous, vague
statement of idealistic vision."9 However, it has the effect of completely
revamping federal decision-making in a nonpareil manner. 10 NEPA first
sets forth a broad national commitment to promoting and protecting the
quality of the environment." Rather than erecting an elaborate regulatory
scheme applicable to the private sector, the act imposes environmental
responsibility on all public officials through specific procedural
mandates. 2 These statutory mandates serve two main purposes: 1) to
ensure that agencies take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences
of the proposed action, and 2) to inform other interested groups and
individuals, providing a springboard for public comment. 3
Since its enactment, NEPA has spawned continuous, massive litigation
and debate over its original legislative intent and its effectiveness in the
environmental arena. In particular, the alternatives requirement under
NEPA is described in the regulations as being the very "heart of the EIS"
and has been critical to sustaining NEPA's impact on proposed federal
actions." The alternatives requirement is intended to force agencies to
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1131-1136 (1997).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 470-470(mm) (1997).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1271-1287 (1997).
8. See Philip Weinberg, it's Time to Put NEPA Back on Course, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 99
(1994).
9. Jean M. Emery, Comment, Environmental Impact Statements and Critical Habitat Does
NEPA Apply to the Designationof CriticalHabitatUnder the EndangeredSpecies Act?, 28 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 973 (1996).
10. See id. at 973.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4331. The overall purpose of NEPA is to "declare a national policy which
will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental
Quality." Id.
12. In this section of NEPA, "Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: 1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 4332. These
requirements include that agencies have as an integral part in proposals for legislation and other
"major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement" foregoing requirements mentioned in the text. Id. § 4332(C).
13. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989).
14. Under this provision, agencies "should present the environmental impacts ofthe proposal
and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear
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consider carrying out a proposed goal in a less environmentally damaging
way by mandating that agencies analyze a reasonable scope of alternatives
to the proposed action. 5 Unfortunately, the requirement itself has
weakened
due to judicial interpretation and an ineffective standard of
6
review.1

This note will include statutory and judicial background information
regarding NEPA and a discussion of the alternatives requirement, from
past to present. It is my hope that after this inquiry, practitioners will
realize the deficiency and narrowness that has been imputed to this vital
requirement under NEPA, as well as the possible environmental effect it
could have if revitalized by agencies and the courts.

basis for choice among options by the decision-maker and the public." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1995).
Specifically, the provision requires that certain alternatives be explored including, but not limited
to, reasonable alternatives, alternatives eliminated from the study, alternatives not within the
jurisdiction of the lead agency, the no action alternative, and mitigation measures. 40 C.F.R. §
1502.14. In addition, the agency should identify a preferred alternative or alternatives, as well as
devote "substantial treatment" to all of the alternatives considered in the EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
Whether an EIS is required is also a highly litigated issue that has generated considerable case law,
especially with regard to exceptions to preparing an EIS. See Melaney Payne, Critically Acclaimed
but not Critically Followed-The Inapplicability of the National Environmental Policy Act to
FederalAgency Actions: Douglas County v. Babbit, 7 VILL. ENVL. L.J. 339 (1996) (articulating
circumstance under which courts have not required the EIS to be prepared by agencies).
15. Most agencies are not experts in the various environmental fields and therefore, careful
analysis and studies should be composed in order to help agencies even determine what
environmental impacts will result from proposed actions and what alternatives exist to minimize
or avoid any detrimental environmental consequences. Without agencies self-imposing NEPA
requirements or interested parties bringing suit for judicial review of agency decision-making,
agencies may not balance environmental concerns in the cost-benefit analysis conducted before
most major federal projects are implemented.
16. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (stating the right of review);
see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1994) (setting the standard of review
as arbitrary and capricious). Section 706 states that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be - (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.. . ." According to court interpretation, a
reviewing court "must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment. . ." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971). The inquiry engaging this standard should be thorough,
but the standard itself is still a narrow one. See id In addition, courts should give agencies
deference in relying on the reasonable opinions of their experts. See id This standard of review
grants the agencies a great deal of discretion in so far as meeting the procedural requirements under
NEPA.
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A. Statutory Framework
NEPA has been hailed by some as the Magna Carta of environmental
legislation, incorporating "action-forcing"' 7 mechanisms for ensuring
informed and reasoned decision-making that includes consideration of
environmental impacts to the human environment."8 Section 101
announces NEPA's basic policy "to use all practicable means and
measures.., to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans."'209
While discretion and flexibility abound in these "sweeping policy goals,
the section following sets forth the critical requirements for which NEPA
is more commonly known.2 ' Section 102 directs federal agencies to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for all "major federal
actions significantly22 affecting the quality of the human environment."23
17. The term "action-forcing" was introduced during the Senate's consideration of NEPA.
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989). It refers to the idea that when
an agency prepares an EIS, the agency ensures that environmental goals are "infused into the
ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government" as NEPA intended. Id. at 372. The
regulations also enforce this notion in section 102(2) by containing "action-enforcing" provisions
that capture the letter and spirit of the Act. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1987).
18. Weinberg, supra note 8, at 973.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
20. Robertson, 109 S. Ct. at 1845.
21. See Lori Hackleman Patterson, Comment, NEPA 's Stronghold: A Noose for the
Endangered Species Act?, COLUM. L. REV. 753, 755-56 (1996-97) (discussing the debate over
whether a NEPA exemption exists with respect to the Secretary of the Interior when action is taken
pursuant to the Endangered Species Act). It is interesting to note that the comment addresses this
issue in such a way as to concede that NEPA has already been weakened considerably due to court
interpretation. See id
22. The term "significantly" requires consideration of
context and intensity: a) Context. This means that the significance of an action
must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national),
the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality. Significance varies with
the setting of the proposed action... (b) Intensity. This refers to the severity of the
impact.. . The following should be considered in evaluation of intensity: (1)
Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse. A significant effect may exist
even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the effect will be beneficial.
(2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety. (3)
Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic or
cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers,
or ecologically critical areas. (4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of
the human environment are likely to be highly controversial.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
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Interestingly, the agencies themselves determine initially whether an
action rises to the level of requiring an EIS.24
To help ensure compliance with this section, Congress formed a central
agency, the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), to implement NEPA
through the development of specific guidelines binding on agencies." In
1978, CEQ promulgated regulations that explain the NEPA process in
some detail. 26 In particular, CEQ flushed out the concept of the EIS,
introduced so briefly in section 102.
The EIS is often a massive undertaking for federal agencies and is
central to most of the disputes and controversies involving NEPA
implementation. In fact, an entire procedure called the Environmental
Assessment (EA) is dedicated merely to deciding if agencies must create
an EIS. 2' Not surprisingly, agencies use their own procedures in creating
the EA and based upon the results, an agency may make a Finding of No
Significant Impact (FONSI). 29 If a FONSI is made, no EIS is required; but
if the EA reveals a significant effect on the environment, then an EIS is
required by NEPA.3 °
Once it is determined that an EIS is necessary, agencies must comply
with further procedural requirements for ensuring that the EIS is
adequate.3 The five categorical requirements that must be discussed in an
EIS are: 1) environmental impacts of the proffered action, 2) unavoidable
adverse effects and alternatives, 3) the relationship between short-term
uses and maintenance of long-term productivity, and 4) any irreversible
commitment of resources.32 Of these five requirements, the alternatives
requirement is imperative to environmentalists. It, in effect, requires
agencies to brainstorm other less environmentally harmful means to
proceed with a project.
A question that has received considerable discussion and vigorous
debate in regards to these five components has been whether review of

24. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.14 (1995).
25. See Patterson, supranote 21, at 757.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370(a).
27. See PERCIVAL, supra note 1, at I I I1.
28. The Environmental Assessment must provide "sufficient evidence and analysis for
determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant
impact." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1995). In addition, the EA should aid the agency in achieving
compliance with NEPA, even when no EIS is necessary and should include a discussion of the
purpose of the proposal and alternatives of the proposed action as required in the EIS. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.9 (1995). This provision basically reinforces the alternatives requirement by forcing
agencies to generate alternatives regardless of whether an actual EIS is required under NEPA.
29. See Patterson, supra note 21, at 757.
30. See id.
31. 40 U.S.C. § 4332(CXi)-(v).
32. Id.
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agency action generating an EIS has a substantive aspect or whether it is
wholly procedural. 33 The difference between these two interpretations is
extremely significant. The former interpretation allows NEPA to mandate
certain outcomes with respect to environmental concerns.34 The latter
allows agencies to balance results as they see fit, as long as the guidelines
are followed to the extent that the decision was an informed one." It is on
this very issue that judicial interpretation becomes cardinal.
B. JudicialInterpretation
Compliance with NEPA is not discretionary and is subject to review by
federal courts to enjoin federal actions failing to meet NEPA's procedural
requirements.36 While federal courts cannot reverse or modify a federal
agency action, they may order an agency to prepare an initial EIS or
prepare a new EIS if the prior EIS is found to be inadequate.37 In general,
the regulations under NEPA receive considerable deference from the
courts. However, as the principal arbiters of NEPA, the courts have also
given further meaning to these provisions through judicial interpretation
and decisions. In the last few decades, treatment of NEPA has changed

dramatically.3"

33. See Weinberg, supra note 8, at 99.
34. Substantive review would permit the courts to review the actual assessment and balancing
of factors that agencies weighed in the decision-making process. If the courts believed that the
agency improperly assigned too much weight to certain factors in light of environmental concerns,
the courts could overturn the agency decision based on its substantive merit. The procedural aspect
of NEPA, however, solely permits courts to review the agency process, and as long as the agency
considered relevant environmental factors, no further inquiry by the court is allowed.
35. See Patterson, supra note 21, at 757.
36. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen. 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980).
37. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989) The Court
addressed the situation of how NEPA applies after a project receives initial approval or has already
begun implementation. See id.at 37 1.The agency argued that NEPA should not apply past a certain
point in the life of the project because the opportunity to weigh costs to the environment against
the benefits of the project disappears at some point. See id.The Court responded by reviewing the
agency's decision not to prepare a supplemental EIS under NEPA's overall objectives to provide
the public with assurances that the agency made a reasoned decision considering environmental
impacts. See id at 377. Although the Court ultimately concluded that a supplement was not
necessary, it did reiterate the importance of keeping an EIS updated with current and accurate
information regardless of what stage a project is in. See id. The CEQ regulations require that
agencies "shall prepare supplements to either draft or final environmental impact statements if..."
the agency makes substantial changes involving environmental concerns or new circumstances or
relevant information bearing on the environmental impacts of the proposed project. 40 C.F.R. §
1502.9(c) (1987).
38. See Percival, supra note 1, at 1111.
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When first introduced, federal courts recognized a substantive
dimension to NEPA.3 9 NEPA common law began with Judge Skelly
Wright's opinion in Calvert Cliffs'CoordinatingComm. v. US. Atomic
Energy Comm 'n in 1971 .' Wright found that judicial review was essential
to ensuring that the legislative intent of protecting environmental quality
was not lost in the "vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy." ' In parsing
the language in NEPA, Wright found both substantive and procedural
standards for federal agencies to follow. He concluded that section 101's
"substantive mandate" recognized in section 102(1) required agencies to
substantively review environmental factors in the decision-making
process.42 Therefore, if a reviewing court found that the "actual balance of
costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient
weight to environmental values," it could reverse a substantive decision of
the agency.43 Injustifying this interpretation, Wright insisted that Congress
had not intended NEPA to merely be a "paper tiger,'" a term that may
more properly describe NEPA today.

For nearly a decade after Wright's decision, almost all of the federal
circuit courts interpreted a substantive mandate in NEPA to conform to its
environmental protection policy and allow for judicial review on the
merits.4" However, four Supreme Court decisions followed and completely
eroded substantive review under NEPA entirely by dicta.' The first case
came in 1976, Kleppe v. Sierra Club," and involved the question of
whether the agency needed to formulate an EIS for the entire region prior
to issuing mining leases.4" The issue in no way involved the availability of
substantive review under NEPA.49 In a footnote, ° the Court declared that
it could only ensure that agencies take a "hard look" at environmental
impacts and that the Court could not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency or interject into an area of agency discretion.5
39. See Weinberg, supra note 8,at 100.
40. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.v.U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n,449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
41. Id at 1I11.

42. Id. at 1112 n.5.
43. Id. at 1115.
44. Id at 1114.
45. See Bartlett, supra note 2, at 422.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id at 427.
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
See id. at 394.
See Bartlett, supra note 2, at n.105.
The footnote was surprising because the federal case law leading up to Kleppe not only

recognized a substantive component to NEPA, but had also determined the scope and availability
of substantive review under NEPA. As a result of this federal case law, Justice Marshall dissented
from the opinion. See Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 421 (Marshall, J.dissenting).
51. Seeid.at4lOn.21.
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The second renowned case, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 2 involved review of rulemaking
procedures that led to the issuance of two construction permits for nuclear
facilities.53 The Court of Appeals found that the rulemaking procedures
were insufficient to meet the requirements of NEPA section 102(2)(C).
The Court reversed and relied in dicta on the "hard look" doctrine
formulated from a footnote in Kleppe.5 4 Expanding on Kleppe, the Court
went further to find that the "role of a court in reviewing the sufficiency
of an agency's consideration of environmental factors is a limited one,
limited both by the time at which the decision was made and by the statute
mandating review."55
The effect of Vermont Yankee is that courts cannot impose new
procedures on agencies not required by NEPA's plain language.56
However, this does not preclude courts from expounding on existing
procedures through mere interpretation, thereby sidestepping the Vermont
Yankee issue of additional procedures. In addition, the Vermont Yankee
court found that although "1NEPA does set forth significant substantive
goals for the Nation . . . its mandate to the agencies is essentially
procedural."57 The blow struck by Vermont Yankee not only reaffirmed the
substantive decline of NEPA, but also restrained the role of the courts of
providing a meaningful check on agency action.
The third case was Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen,5" which involved a decision by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to build low-income housing.59 In holding that the
decision to build was not arbitrary, the Court framed the analysis in terms
of meeting NEPA's procedural requirements." Again, the Court referred
to past dicta and cited Vermont Yankee for the conclusion that once
agencies have followed NEPA's procedural requirements to reach a
decision, the role of the Court is limited to simply assuring that
environmental consequences were considered. In other words, agencies
need not elevate environmental concerns over other considerations that are
deemed appropriate.

52. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
53. See id at 527, 552-55.

54. See i at 555 (quoting Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n.2 1).
55. Id.

56. See Bartlett, supra note 2, at 429.
57. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 555.

58. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
59. See id.

60. See id. at 223-27.
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The final case in the Court's progression toward dismantling
substantive review was Robertson v. Methow Valley CitizensCouncil.6' In
Robertson, the Court approved the position taken in Strycker's Bay.62 The
Forest Service had issued a permit for a ski resort.63 The EIS for the ski
resort was challenged for failing to have adequately fulfilled NEPA's
procedural requirements of examining worst-case scenarios and
developing mitigation measures. 4 Following what may be characterized
as a trend in supporting land development, the Court held that section
102(2)(C)'s requirements did not call for any actual mitigation or worstcase scenarios at all.65
Once again, the Court diverged from the issue in the case and declared
in dicta that "although [NEPA's] procedures are almost certain to affect
the agency's substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA itself
does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary
process. ' 6 In what has become a coin phrase for NEPA, the Court
summed up NEPA's effect by asserting that "NEPA merely prohibits
uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action."67
Consequently, these cases set the course for diminishing NEPA's
strength to its sole ability to force agencies to follow the prescribed
procedural requirements. 6' Although the EIS remains an essential
mechanism for environmentalists, its potential for re-shaping agency
actions and elevating environmental concerns has been halted, if not
entirely lost.
III. THE ALTERNATIVES REQUIREMENT
A. Background
In turning now to the main focus of this Article, it is necessary to first
confiront the specific provisions in NEPA making up the alternatives
requirement. First, NEPA requires that an EIS prepared by a petitioning
agency include a discussion of alternatives to the federal action being
considered when the proposal involves "unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources."69 While the CEQ regulations

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
4332(D).

Robertson, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
See Bartlett, supra note 2, at 431.
See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 332.
See id.at 337, 345-46.
See id at 353.
See id at 350.
See id.at351.
See Patterson, supra note 21, at 758.
This provision mainly deals with the requirements for agency jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. §
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describe the alternatives requirement as being the very "heart of the EIS,"'70
courts have similarly referred to it as the "linchpin of the entire impact
statement."'
The alternatives provision directs agencies to "rigorously explore and
objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,"' as well as to discuss the
reasons for rejecting alternatives from the detailed study.'3 This provision
charges agencies with the task of considering whether a proposed action
can be carried out in a less environmentally damaging manner or whether
alternatives exist making the action unnecessary altogether. The
regulations require at least three types of alternatives to be considered
before a reasoned choice can be made: 1) the no-action alternative, 4
2) other reasonable courses of action, 75 and 3) mitigation measures not
already included in the proposed action.' 6 Once alternatives are identified,
agencies must "devote substantial treatment" to each alternative
considered so that the analysis for each alternative is substantially
similar
77
to the degree of analysis devoted to the proposed action itself.
As the Court noted in City ofAlexandria v. Slater,7' NEPA's provision
requiring "reasonable alternatives" to be discussed does not offer much
guidance for reviewing courts.' 9 Therefore, courts begin an alternatives
analysis by first looking at the objectives of the proposal itself.' These
stated objectives necessarily define the range of alternatives an agency
must consider.8 For this reason, agencies are precluded from defining the
proposal's objectives too narrowly, so as to avoid assessing a wider range
of alternatives to the proposed action.' For example, an agency cannot
define its objective in such a way that the objective can only be

70. 42 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1995).
71. See Monroe County Conservation Soc'y, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 697, 698 (1978).
72. It is important to stop and note the language that Congress used to impose these
procedural requirements. Surely Congress meant strict application of these provisions based on
their use of words such as "rigorously" and "objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives."
Unfortunately, these requirements seem to lack the muster that Congress originally intended.
73. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.13-.14 (1995).
74. The no-action alternative refers to the current status quo, what the circumstances are, or
would be if the agency took no action at all.
75. This subsection basically refers to all other reasonable alternatives that the agency must

consider, not withstanding the no-action alternative.
76. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1995).
77. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(b) (1995).
78. City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
79. Id.
80. See Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195 (D. Cir. 1991).
81. d at 196.
82. Idl at 196; see also Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1175 (10th
Cir. 1999).
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accomplished in one way, the applicant's proposed project.8 3 In addition,
agencies must consider alternatives that only partially meet the proposed
objectives."
If the agency's objectives are deemed reasonable, an agency's
alternatives analysis is then examined under a "rule of reason" approach.
The "rule of reason" confers upon agencies a duty to affimnatively
generate and consider a range of alternatives 5 sufficient to allow for a
reasoned choice. 6 In conducting this analysis, courts give substantial
deference to the agency's policy-making role and expertise.87 In addition,
agencies still retain discretion in making the ultimate choice of action, as
long as the agency can demonstrate that the choice was a reasoned one. 8
This approach to agency decision-making under NEPA is a direct result of
court interpretation limiting NEPA to a procedural dimension.89
Although an agency must consider alternatives that partially or
completely meet the stated objectives of the proposed action, 9' the concept
of alternatives must necessarily be restricted by some notion of
feasibility.9 Courts have found that agencies need not consider alternatives
requiring remote and speculative implementation or whose effect cannot
be reasonably ascertained.9' In addition, alternatives that can be
implemented only after significant changes in government policy or
legislation need not be considered by agencies, according to court
interpretation.93 Nonetheless, the agency should go "beyond mere
assertions" and provide sufficient information and reasoning to enable
interested parties to comment on the EIS. 94

83. See Colorado, 185 F.3d at 1175.

84. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 91 (2nd Cir. 1975). The challengers in this case argued that the
final EIS was inadequate and that a complete EIS should accompany all stages of the decision-

making process. See id.The Court agreed that an EIS and all its accompanying supplements must
be circulated and considered prior to any decision being reached or the purposes ofNEPA become
a mere mockery of legislation. See id at 91-92.
85. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,835 (D. Cir. 1972) (stating
that when the federal action being proposed is part of a coordinated plan to deal with a larger
problem, the range of alternatives that an agency must consider is broadened as well).
86. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
87. See id.
88. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 499 F.2d
1109 (D. Cir. 1971); see also State of N.C. v. FAA, 957 F.2d 1125, 1134-35 (4th Cir. 1992).
89. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 532 (Dist. Ct. Cir. 1993) (stating NEPA
"does not dictate agency policy or determine the fate of contemplated action").
90. See Callaway, 524 F.2d at 93.
91. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551.
92. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Medford Dist., 914 F.2d 1174, 1180 (9th
Cir. 1990).
93. See Callaway, 524 F.2d at 93.
94. See id.
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The "rule of reason" approach, coupled with the fact that the agency
itself is conducting the analysis, creates a situation heavily laden with
bias.95 For this reason, NEPA may regain its strength simply by having the
EIS prepared by independent agencies lacking any vested interest in the
results. At least one court has recognized the possibility of agencies
halfheartedly meeting NEPA's alternative requirement and held that
agencies must consider a range of alternatives proportional to the
significance of the environmental impact that will result from the proposed
action.' However, until Congress seriously addresses this possibility, the
courts will remain the sole arbiters and means of independent agency
decision-making review.
B. Case Analysis
As far back as 1972, shortly after NEPA's enactment, at least one
justice recognized the importance of strictly enforcing the alternatives
requirement. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in Scenic Hudson
PreservationConference v. Fed Power Comm ?? arguing that petition
should be granted to decide whether the Federal Power Commission
complied with NEPA's obligations in granting a license for construction
of a pumped storage power project.9" In listing NEPA's overall goals,
Douglas noted that section 102 is meant to ensure that an environmentally
acceptable alternative will be chosen, if and when a project is approved."
Conceding that agency decisions should be given some deference,
Justice Douglas still argued that the substantial evidence test was not the
proper reviewing standard for decisions from agencies lacking
environmental expertise."° In addition, Douglas also believed that the
procedural obligations under section 102 of NEPA were not met.' ° 1
Instead, it seemed that environmental considerations were only brought to
light after private citizens brought them to the agency's attention.0 2
The agency limited its alternatives analysis to those alternatives that
03
had been submitted by the environmentalists opposing the project.1
According to Douglas, this clearly failed the procedural requirements of
NEPA directing agencies to consider the environmental impacts of its

95. See City ofAlexandria, 198 F.3d at 865.
96. See City of New Haven v. Chandler, 446 F.Supp 925 (Dist. Conn. 1978).
97. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 407 U.S. 926 (1972)
(J. Douglas, dissenting).
98. See id.
99. Id. at 929.
100. See id.at 931.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 932.
103. See id.
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actions." Rather, the agency should have used its expertise to generate
alternatives having less of an environmental impact, without regard to
whether or not opposing groups proposed alternatives.' ° Completely
overlooked by the agency, no information at all was provided with respect
to not building the project at all."°
The ramifications of the agency's failures fall on Congress and the
public since neither can decipher the value judgments made by the agency
from a record so lacking in analysis. °7 Whether or not NEPA allows for
substantive review of agency decisions, Congress and the public are still
entitled to understand the judgments made by the agency.10 With more
insight than he realized, Douglas acknowledged that if such an EIS is
allowed, NEPA "becomes only a ritual and like the peppercorn a mere
symbol that has no vital meaning.' 9
Unfortunately, hindsight has proven Douglas's prediction to be a reality
today and lax interpretation ofNEPA's requirements are to blame. Recent
cases continue to reflect the reluctance of the courts to strictly enforce
NEPA's procedural requirements, especially the alternatives
requirement."' In City of Alexandria v. Slater, the Federal Highway
Administration's approval of a proposal to replace the Woodrow Wilson
Memorial Bridge was challenged."' In the agency's final EIS, eight
alternative proposals were discussed.1 2 However, each of the alternatives,
except the no-build alternative, consisted of a twelve-lane design and the
only difference in these alternatives was the kind of river crossing
proposed (tunnel or bridge)." 3

104. See id.
105. See id

106. In other words, the agency failed to consider the no-action alternative specifically
mandated for consideration in the regulations. See id.
107. See id. at 933. The function of the EIS is to inform the public and Congress as to how an
agency reached a decision. See id As a result of the inadequacy of the EIS, Douglas noted that
there is no way to calculate how much money was gained at the expense of the environmental
destruction that will result from the project. See id The purpose of the EIS is not served when the
public is told that the project alternative is cheap and reliable, although causes destruction to the
surrounding ecology. See id.
Douglas focused on the informative purposes of NEPA and how this
function cannot be carried out when the agency record does not disclose reasons for choosing the
preferred alternative over other alternatives that may be less environmentally damaging. See id.
108. See id
109. Id Douglas went on to state that the decision below would be the "beginning of the
demise of the mandate of NEPA."
110. See City ofAlexandria, 198 F.3d; see also City of St. Louis v. Slater, 212 F. 3d 448 (D.
Cir. 1999).
111. See City ofAlexandria, 198 F.3d at 862.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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The Court began its alternatives analysis by noting that NEPA does not
substantively restrict the agency's choice of objectives." 4 The Court then
engaged in an inquiry that analyzed the reasonableness of the objectives
and the subsequent reasonableness of the alternatives fulfilling those
objectives. " 5 The main contention from appellees concerned the agency's
failure to consider a ten-lane bridge as a reasonable alternative. 1 6 In
rejecting the argument of the appellees, the Court concluded that the
agency need not consider a ten-lane bridge because it did not offer a
"complete solution to the problem."' " 7 This contention completely ignores
prior precedent requiring agencies to consider alternatives that either
partially or completely achieve the proposed objectives."'
In another recent case, challengers brought an action to contest the
approval of an airport expansion project." 9 The Court majority held that
the FAA had met NEPA's procedural obligations, including assessing all
reasonable alternatives to the proposed project. ° However, a dissenting
opinion stated that the FAA and the Court had "misconceived the nature
and purpose of the NEPA process.''. Stating that the alternatives
requirement is a key part of the evaluation, the dissenting opinion
concluded that the FAA had excluded reasonable alternatives from the

114. See id. at 865. The Court also noted that the district court impermissibly interpreted

NEPA as a substantive statute instead of a procedural one by suggesting the agency's failure to
prioritize environmental goals violated NEPA.
115. See id The agency focused primarily on transportation and safety issues in articulating
the objectives of the proposed bridge reconstruction.
116. See id. at 866. The agency conducted a study showing that a ten-lane bridge could
accommodate almost as much traffic as what was projected for daily traffic flow on the bridge in
2020.
117. Id. The Court seemed very concerned with the fact that the agency had the sole

responsibility for solving the congestion problem resulting from the existing bridge and that no
other agency would probably step in and alleviate the congestion that might result from building
only a ten-lane bridge.
118. See Callaway, 524 F.2d at 93.
119. See City ofSt. Louis, 212 F.3d at 448.
120. See id. The FAA utilized a three tier system where in the first tier each alternative had
to fulfill operational goals of the project to continue on to the second tier analysis. See id at 456.
Only two alternatives plus the no-action alternative survived the first two tiers of analysis for
various reasons, none environmental considerations. See id.Petitioners believed that several of the

alternatives rejected in the first two tiers of the analysis were reasonable and therefore, should have
been included in the detailed EIS.
121. See id. at 464. (J.Arnold, dissenting). While recognizing that no substantive review under
NEPA is possible for FAA's decision, Judge Arnold concluded that NEPA consists of more than
the majority conceded. See id. Although NEPA is procedural, agencies must still go through the
thorough process prescribed in the statute, exposing the agency's decision-making to the scrutiny
of Congress as well as the public.
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analysis.'22 These cases represent the current trend of allowing NEPA
procedural requirements, especially the alternatives requirement, to fall to
the wayside of relaxed judicial interpretation.
In conclusion, Congress's enactment ofNEPA gave environmentalists
high hopes for serious changes to be made and enforced in the agency
decision-making process with respect to environmental concerns. The
decline and eventual end to substantive review of agency decisions under
NEPA severely hinders the ability of environmental groups to ensure that
agencies are seriously considering the environmental impacts of their
decisions. However, strict procedural enforcement of NEPA's
requirements can and should be an effective tool for reviewing agency
processes.
Although the administrative state is a necessary aspect of modern
government, it lacks the types of checks and balances afforded to the
traditional branches of government. For this reason, the public should be
given the opportunity to challenge the validity of agency processes, and
courts should give NEPA the force Congress intended. Of the procedural
mandates enforced under NEPA, the alternatives requirement has the most
promise for ensuring environmental consciousness in agency decisionmaking. Without strict court enforcement, however, the requirement will
lie with the rest of the act as a mere "paper tiger."

122. See id. The dissenting opinion noted that the three tier system allowed for what might
have been reasonable alternatives. In addition, alternatives that only partially meet the agency's
objectives can lead the decision-maker to conclude that accomplishing part of the objectives with
less environmental impacts is preferred. See id at 465.

